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Institutional reform processes can be contested. The
more so by those working in the affected institutions.
Bureaucracies, in particular, can be resistant to change.
To better understand such processes, we study the
regional reform in Norway. This reform is interesting
as it mixes “voluntary” and “forced” dynamics. Indeed,
Norwegian regions (fylkeskommuner) can remain
unchanged, merge voluntarily, or be forced to merge by
central government. This provides an opportunity to
better understand support for coerced change. Through
a survey of regional bureaucrats, we test different
explanations of support for forced mergers. We find
that two logics are at play. A “logic of discipline” which
appeals to right-wing bureaucrats, advocates larger
units, and streamlined bureaucracies, even if this is
against the wishes of the main actors involved. And an
“identity logic” which recognizes that feelings of
attachment are powerful shapers of preferences beyond
what efficiency and functionality dictate.
1 | INTRODUCTION
Institutions evolve. Sometimes incrementally, other times more dramatically. Such evolution is
key to their survival but also a reflection of the changing nature of their environment. Public
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authorities are submitted to the same evolutionary pressures as any other institutional struc-
ture. However, their architects have an array of options when it comes to reform processes and
outcomes. Public authorities may be reformed marginally and gradually, just as they may be
reformed more profoundly and fundamentally. Thus, democratic political systems are charac-
terized by constant reform processes spanning the whole array from cosmetic changes to more
spectacular reforms. In this way, central banks have been granted some autonomy, regulatory
agencies have been established, supranational governance structures have been created, and
the provision of public goods has been variably outsourced to the private sector (Garriga, 2016;
Jordana et al., 2018; Peters, 2018).
Regional authorities too have noticeably changed in the past decades. Many democracies
have created new regional bodies, allowed them to be directly elected, and endowed them with
growing competences (Dardanelli, 2018; Hooghe & Marks, 2016; Trinn & Schulte, 2020). How-
ever, once created, these regional authorities have also evolved. Competences have been shifted
up or down the governance ladder and sometimes jurisdictional boundaries have been redrawn,
from merger and amalgamation processes all the way to possible secession from the domestic
polity (Tatham & Mbaye, 2018; Zimmerbauer et al., 2017).
In these reforms, policy-makers have a choice. They not only choose the extent and depth of
reform, but also the process by which these reforms are taken forward. Such processes may be
voluntary, such as cooperation agreements and consensual mergers between neighboring units.
But they may also be coercive, such as the creation of new governance structures subsuming
existing institutions or forced mergers between unwilling partners. The success of the more
forceful types of reforms very much depends on the willingness of those affected to comply and
to make the new institutions work (Afonso & Venâncio, 2019: 19). In other words, gaining sup-
port from those directly affected by forced reforms is an important element of successful institu-
tional change.
Indeed, bureaucrats are relevant actors within democratic systems. Of course, bureaucrats
are neither legislators nor political decision-takers. However, they matter in the shaping of
reform proposals as well as in their implementation. They matter from the street-level adminis-
trator to the élite civil servant working in the higher echelons of the bureaucracy
(Christensen, 2012; Paquet, 2020). Bureaucracies both shape and constrain reforms, especially
when the reform directly concerns the public administration itself (Asatryan et al., 2017;
Boon & Verhoest, 2018). Obviously, we do not argue that bureaucrats are the main drivers or
shapers of reform. Many other actors play leading roles in reform processes, from politicians to
the media, from civil society to interest groups. However, just as the role of bureaucrats should
not be overstated, it is equally clear that bureaucrats do play a role and that they may hamper
or constrain the reform agenda of elected governments. This contribution aims to further our
understanding of bureaucratic support for coerced institutional change. Bureaucrats matter to
understand reforms, the more so when they themselves are the object of the reform (Gains &
John, 2010; Peters & Pierre, 2008).
In this context, the Norwegian case offers an opportunity to gain some insights into the
determinants of support for forced territorial mergers. Norway has undergone a significant
regional reform culminating in 2020 with a reduction from 19 to 11 regions. This is the most
significant redrawing of its regional map since the introduction of absolutism in the 1660s
(Flo, 2014). Crucially, the reform process mixed voluntary and forced dynamics. Norwegian
regions could remain intact, merge voluntarily, or be forcefully merged by central government.
The reform's stated objectives were to increase regional autonomy, improve regional public ser-
vices, and cut down on bureaucracy. The format and magnitude of the reform represent an
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opportunity to better understand the determinants of support for forced mergers by those most
directly affected by it, but also by those key to the success of any reform process: the bureau-
crats working in the regional authorities themselves.
We here present the results of a large-scale survey of over 1000 regional bureaucrats. This sur-
vey enables us to better understand what shapes attitudes towards forced mergers. Focusing on
framing effects, merger preferences, political ideology, and identity effects, we find the following.
Typical frames hardly affect attitudes towards forced mergers, with the exception of arguments
underlining efficiency gains through a reduction of bureaucracy. These arguments resonate par-
ticularly strongly with right-wing bureaucrats and those in favor of the voluntary variant of
mergers. Indeed, bureaucracy reduction, right-wing ideology, and support for voluntary mergers
constitute a golden triangle of support for forced mergers. Inversely, identity effects, as captured
by feelings of attachment, trigger opposition towards coerced institutional change.
The rest of this article is structured as follows. We first present our main expectations
regarding the shapers of attitudes towards forced mergers. We then discuss data and methodol-
ogy before turning our attention to both direct and mediated determinants of support. We con-
clude with some wider reflections outlining the potency of two countervailing logics: a “logic of
discipline” advocating economies of scales, larger units, and streamlined bureaucracies, even if
this is against the wishes of the main actors involved; and an “identity logic” which recognizes
that feelings of belonging and attachment are powerful shapers of preferences beyond what effi-
ciency and functionality dictate.
2 | ATTITUDES TOWARDS FORCED TERRITORIAL
MERGERS—FOUR EXPLANATIONS
Research on territorial amalgamation has paid little attention forced mergers (Erlingsson
et al., 2020; Zimmerbauer et al., 2017). And even less on how regional bureaucrats react to
them. Attitudes towards forced territorial mergers may be shaped by a variety of factors. We
here focus on four such factors: (1) framing effects in terms of the reform increasing regional
autonomy, improving regional public services, and reducing bureaucracy; (2) merger prefer-
ences in terms of attitudes towards voluntary mergers; (3) ideological preferences in terms of
left–right political preferences; and finally (4) identity effects in terms of feelings of attachment
to one's region.
Bureaucrats' assessment of the framing of an institutional reform may affect their level of
support for the reform in question. Territorial reforms are framed as serving a variety of pur-
poses. These frames are mobilized by their advocates as legitimizing devices. Some arguments
may “stick” and have a greater impact than others, although a variety of arguments are inevita-
bly mobilized. Three classes of arguments are usually invoked when reforming existing territo-
rial institutions. Regional reform can be viewed as a means to increase regional autonomy,
improve services, or increase efficiency by cutting bureaucracy. All three considerations tend to
gravitate around reform debates (Keating, 2017).
The first consideration regards autonomy. In democratic systems, scholars have documented
the multiplication of reforms aimed at increasing territorial autonomy, be it at the regional or
at the local level (Dardanelli, 2018; Ladner et al., 2016; Trinn & Schulte, 2020). For example,
Marks et al. (2008) highlight a preponderance of institutional reforms since the 1970s. These
usually increase autonomy from central government by awarding greater self-rule to the
regional level. In a dataset covering 42 democracies over 56 years, they underline that greater
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autonomy is the norm: “where we see reform over time, it is in the direction of greater, not less,
regional authority by a ratio of eight to one” (Marks et al., 2008: 167). These findings were later
found to hold for a wider sample of 82 democracies in the 1950–2010 interval, with a peak in
decentralization reforms in the 1990s (Hooghe & Marks, 2016: 52).
A second element motivating territorial reform has been the provision of superior public
goods. Through the reform of the territorial architecture of government, one could provide bet-
ter services to citizens. These arguments are commonly found in the consolidation/
fragmentation debates regarding metropolitan governance (Norris, 2001) as well as in the “new
regionalism” school of thought (Keating, 1997). They mostly have to do with increased pressure
for territorial coordination and planning, improved models of public service delivery, as well as
cultivating attractiveness for capital investments and territorial competitiveness (Brenner, 2003,
2004). Many of these arguments find their roots in discussions about the changing nature of
state spatiality (Keating, 2013: 72) and evolving functional pressures (Hooghe & Marks, 2009).
A third argument is less about the quality of services but rather their efficiency, especially in
terms of cutting back on bureaucracy, maximizing economies of scale, and streamlining the
administration. As in the case of service quality, these arguments are contested (Blom-Hansen
et al., 2020). Some studies highlight that while amalgamation may partially improve public ser-
vice delivery, it very often has negative effects on local democracy, especially in terms of citizen
involvement (Roesel, 2017; Steiner & Kaiser, 2017). Overall, the literature highlights that there
can be some efficiency gains through amalgamation, but that these are conditioned by a variety
of factors (Afonso & Venâncio, 2019; Hanes, 2015). Despite empirical uncertainty, efficiency
gains and bureaucratic streamlining represent key narratives mobilized in times of institutional
reform—the more so when it comes to mergers (Blom-Hansen et al., 2020; Callanan
et al., 2014). These three justificatory frames can be expected to affect bureaucrats' support for
forced territorial mergers. They can be formulated in the following way:
H1. Framing effects—perceived importance of arguments linked to the reform.
H1a. The more a bureaucrat considers increasing regional autonomy to be
important in the reform, the greater the support for forced mergers.
H1b. The more a bureaucrat considers improving regional services to be impor-
tant in the reform, the greater the support for forced mergers.
H1c. The more a bureaucrat considers reducing bureaucracy to be important in
the reform, the greater the support for forced mergers.
The amalgamation literature has underlined the relevance of consultation processes and of
consensus building around merger reforms. Be it in terms of sufficient consultation of the
affected citizens (Ryan et al., 2016: 385) or of consensus among political actors (Erlingsson
et al., 2015). Despite this, debates on amalgamation have usually revolved around the pros and
cons of mergers, to the detriment of questions about processes, be they more top-down or
bottom-up. The literature's lack of discussion of questions of processes (forced vs. voluntary)
means that some of the fundamental problems of enforcing amalgamation through coercion
have been overlooked. Such coercive processes can be at odds with self-government values, and
to some extent human rights and individual autonomy too (Erlingsson et al., 2020). When
understanding attitudes towards forced mergers, it is therefore of essence to factor in attitudes
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towards voluntary mergers. Bureaucratic responses to forced mergers may be driven by the idea
of merging or not, but also by the nature of the proposed merger process. We expect that prefer-
ences towards amalgamation itself (to merge or not to merge) will shed some light over atti-
tudes regarding processes (forced or voluntary). In other words, if a bureaucrat is in favor of a
merger, whether it is forced or voluntary may well become secondary. Preferences over the out-
come will take precedence over the process. We formalize this hypothesis as follows:
H2. Attitudes towards voluntary mergers.
H2. The more positive a bureaucrat's views towards voluntary mergers, the
greater the support for forced mergers.
Questions of territorial reform often become entangled in party politics. According to Toubeau
and Massetti (2013), political parties will push for territorial reforms based on the relative weight
of their strategic incentives (esp. electoral gains), their ideological positioning, and their organiza-
tional constraints. In theory, this means that reform can be driven by left-wing and right-wing
parties alike. However, a large comparative study based on 31 advanced democracies suggests
parties on the economic right are more supportive of decentralization reforms than parties on the
economic left, and that this left–right effect outperforms other political dimensions such as those
pertaining to cultural liberalism and conservatism (Toubeau & Wagner, 2015: 110).
Clearly regional mergers are a very specific type of territorial reform. And forced mergers
even more so. Additionally, the political positions and preferences of bureaucrats remain some-
what of a black box, in part because bureaucrats are reluctant to reveal their ideological inclina-
tions (Tatham & Bauer, 2016). The article by Toubeau and Wagner (2015) nonetheless provides
a basis for expecting a positive bias from right-wing bureaucrats towards territorial reform. The
more so as the few studies exploring political ideology and territorial amalgamation tend to sug-
gest a positive link between right-wing politics and mergers. Indeed, in an analysis of merger
projects in Switzerland, Steiner finds that, while the left–right orientation of the local govern-
ment does not significantly affect inter-municipal cooperation projects, right-wing orientation
does significantly affect the likelihood of concrete merger plans (Steiner, 2003: 563).
At a more abstract level, the rhetoric associated with mergers chimes well with more right-
wing and indeed maybe neoliberal views of governmental restructuring. Concepts of efficiency
gains and reduction of bureaucracy, of economies of scales, and of larger decentralized units
resonate with narratives associated with the right-hand-side of the political spectrum. Forced
mergers additionally entail difficult questions of democracy, community, and legitimacy
(Erlingsson et al., 2015; Erlingsson et al., 2020). Their coercive nature fits with a “logic of disci-
pline” originating from economic liberalism (Roberts, 2011). Indeed, Roberts highlights that,
when making decisions on the architecture of government, such a “logic of discipline” shifts
the emphasis away from democratic practices and is inclined to impose some constraints on
elected officials and citizens (2011: 5). We consequently expect that support for forced mergers
will be more likely among right-wing bureaucrats than among their left-wing colleagues. We
express this hypothesis in the following way:
H3. Political ideology.
H3. The more right leaning a bureaucrat, the greater the support for forced
mergers.
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The final explanation has to do with identity effects. Beyond efficiency and functionality,
identity and community have been shown to shape preferences for the territorial architecture of
government (Keating, 2013: 74–90; Rokkan & Urwin, 1983: 135). Such identity and community
logics have formed the basis for an overarching “postfunctionalist theory of governance.” This
theory posits that one can only understand governance preferences and structures through the
analysis of both functional logics (as driven by externalities and economies of scale) and com-
munity logics (as driven by identity and feelings of belonging). Both are constitutive of the
observable architecture of government. However, they differ in pre-eminence. The authors of
this theory argue that community “is decisive for territorial politics within the state (…) whereas
efficiency lies far back in the causal chain leading to jurisdictional reform” (Hooghe &
Marks, 2016: 158). Indeed, Hooghe and Marks underscore how identity and community shape
demands for self-government and that these in turn tend to take precedence over more nitty-
gritty discussions about policy or types of public goods. Hence, while functional pressures often
trigger questions over policy preferences, community or identity pressures ask difficult questions
over polity preferences (Hooghe & Marks, 2016: 2).
Such identity effects become particularly relevant in the context of territorial mergers. If
identity triggers a discussion about polity shaping rather than policy shaping, then identity
will be of prime importance when discussing the territorial boundaries of the polity. One will
expect identity to kick-in particularly strongly when territorial jurisdictions are being redrawn
on the map (Zimmerbauer & Paasi, 2013). As Hooghe and Marks indicate, “contestation about
the boundaries of the polity has a way of upstaging contestation about policy” (2016: 158).
Identity logics are usually driven by ethnic, linguistic, historical, cultural, or geographical fac-
tors. They translate into feelings of belonging and attachment, which in turn affect prefer-
ences for the territorial architecture of government. We therefore expect that bureaucrats
exhibiting a strong feeling of attachment to their region will react rather adversely to pro-
posals to redraw their territory, especially in a forceful, coercive way. We express this hypoth-
esis in the following way:
H4. Feeling of attachment.
H4. The stronger the feeling of attachment of a bureaucrat to their region, the
weaker the support for forced mergers.
Clearly, the above hypotheses only cover a fragment of the possible explanations of bureau-
cratic support for forced mergers. However, we do think that framing effects regarding the goals
of the reform, support for the voluntary variant of mergers, left–right ideology, and attachment
to one's region are important avenues of research within this field of study. Our theoretical
focus is therefore limited to these explanatory factors. Nonetheless, we submit our main explan-
atory variables to a series of controls. Overall, we include 33 additional variables. These com-
prise regional factors such as the geographical clustering of regions, population size,
unemployment levels, the extent of existing municipal mergers, and center-periphery status.
Controls also include individual factors such as a bureaucrat's educational background, employ-
ment domain, status, and experience, as well as previous professional experiences at different
levels of government or outside of the public sector (see “Controls” section below and Supple-
mentary Material, Table S1). Finally, we also test for the effect of belonging to forced-merged
regions (see Supplementary Material, Figure S2).
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3 | DATA AND METHODS
We test the above expectations on the Norwegian case. This case is particularly relevant in the
study of coerced territorial amalgamations as Norway had hardly changed its regional borders
since the 1660s. We here provide some background on the Norwegian reform, some informa-
tion on how we collected our data, and finally on how we analyze these data.
3.1 | The Norwegian case
In 2017 the Norwegian government announced the merger of its 19 regions (fylkeskommuner)
into 11 by 2020. This territorial merger process is accompanied by a reform of the competences
and tasks of the new regional entities. Both processes have been contested but have nonetheless
been implemented.
By the end of the merger process, four regions have remained intact. These are the regions of
Rogaland, Oslo (which has a peculiar status, see below), Møre og Romsdal, and Nordland. These
regions were unwilling to merge in the first place and central government respected this. The
remaining 15 regions merged. Six of them did so willingly. These are Nord-Trøndelag and Sør-
Trøndelag (merging into Trøndelag), Aust-Agder and Vest-Agder (merging into Agder), and
finally Buskerud and Troms. These two regions were willing to merge but with unwilling part-
ners: with Akershus and Østfold in the case of Buskerud (merging into Viken) and with Fin-
nmark in the case of Troms (merging into Troms og Finnmark). Hence, 10 of the 19 regions
either did not merge or merged willingly. Four regions were willing to merge but did not get the
merger they identified as acceptable. They were forced into a different merger. These are Vestfold
and Telemark (merging into Vestfold og Telemark) and Hordaland and Sogn og Fjordane (merg-
ing into Vestland). The remaining five regions were unwilling to merge but were nonetheless
forced to. These are the Akershus and the Østfold regions which were forced to merge with
Buskerud (into the new region of Viken), Hedmark and Oppland (forced into the new region of
Innlandet), and finally the Finnmark region. This last region was forced to merge with Troms
(into Troms og Finnmark). Overall, 10 regions had their preferences respected (i.e., no merger or
a voluntary merger) while nine regions ended up in forced marriage (i.e., a merger with forced
partners, or a forced merger tout court). Table 1 summarizes this information.
TABLE 1 Regional mergers in Norway
Central government's merger decision:
Respects the preference of the
region (i.e., willing merger or
did not merge)
Does not respect the preference of the
region (i.e., merger with forced partners or










Oslo, Rogaland, Møre og Romsdal,
Nordland
Akershus, Østfold, Hedmark, Oppland,
Finnmark
Note: Authors' compilation based on parliamentary documentation detailing the regions' assessment and review of mergers
with neighboring regions (see: Prop. 84 S (2016–2017), 2017).
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Norway's regions do not have any constitutional or other legal protection against top-down
institutional change. Hence, throughout the process, they could only state their preferences
towards the central government, which had signaled its intent to carry out the amalgamation
reform even in the absence of agreement. The decision to merge regions by force has been con-
troversial. The parliamentary opposition regularly called for reversals of some or all mergers,
while regional politicians have boycotted, tried to halt, and legally challenged the merger pro-
cesses. Norwegian history has witnessed instances of regional consolidation (and fragmenta-
tion) and of periodic institutional reforms in the past (Selstad, 2003). However, the current
regional reform constitutes the single largest transformation of regional borders since the 17th
century (Flo, 2014).
3.2 | Data collection and operationalization
In order to test the above hypotheses, we conducted a survey of regional bureaucrats. The sur-
vey ran from November 2017 to January 2018. It covered all of Norway's regions
(fylkeskommuner) except the Oslo region. Indeed, Norway's capital combines municipal and
regional statuses. Hence, the city does not have a separate regional government of its own.
Instead, regional matters are directly managed by its local government.
Prior to receiving the survey, each regional administration's management was informed of
the forthcoming study. Data collection was approved by the Norwegian Centre for Research
Data (NSD). The survey was run via a web-based survey tool (SurveyXact). Contact details for
bureaucrats was collected from the regional governments' websites. 3628 individuals were iden-
tified. Those who had not responded to the initial invitation received two reminders at two-
week intervals. Of the initial recipients, 1107 responded to the survey in full, yielding a response
rate of about 30.5%.
Respondents were on average 49 years old, equally balanced between men and women (52%
vs. 48%), having usually completed 4–5 years of higher education, and with about 10 years'
experience in the regional administration. Across the three main hierarchical ranks in regional
government, 77% of them occupied the lower ranks (advisor/“consultant”), 15% occupied mid-
dle management positions, and about 8% occupied top-level management positions. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first and largest Norway-wide survey of regional bureaucrats ever
conducted.
Information to test our hypotheses was collected through the survey instrument. Support
for forced mergers was operationalized through a simple question enquiring about bureau-
crats' stance towards forced mergers on a five-point scale ranging from “very negative” (=1)
to “very positive” (=5). Framing effects were captured by three questions enquiring about
how important the respondent finds a series of factors regarding the new regional division
and governance structure Norway will have through the reform. Three factors were then
detailed. They concerned increased regional autonomy, improved public services from the
region, and efficiency gains through a reduction of bureaucracy. All were measured on a
five-point scale ranging from “not at all important” (=1) to “very important” (=5). Bureau-
crats' support towards voluntary mergers was measured on the same scale as that of forced
mergers, from a “very negative” view (=1) to a “very positive” view (=5). Political ideology
was measured through self-placement on a five-point left–right scale comprising the “left”
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(=1), “center-left” (=2), “center” (=3), “center-right” (=4), and “right” (=5). Finally,
regarding feelings of attachment, respondents were asked to what degree they feel attached
to the region where they are employed, from 1 (no attachment) to 10 (very strong attach-
ment). A translation of the survey questions is provided in the supplementary material
(Box S1).
3.3 | Controls
Bureaucratic attitudes may be affected by a plurality of factors beyond those of interest in this
study. Although we are not theoretically interested in their effects, we nonetheless control for
some of them and assess to what extent they affect our variables of interest. We therefore col-
lected additional survey and non-survey data. We distinguish between two broad groups of
controls.
The first group concerns basic demographic, economic, and cultural factors at the regional
level. These include regional unemployment levels and demographic weight. They also
include broad geographical clustering, more specifically whether the region is situated in the
Eastern (Østfold, Akershus, Buskerud, Hedmark, Oppland, Telemark, Vestfold), Southern
(Aust-Agder, Vest-Agder), Western (Rogaland, Hordaland, Sogn og Fjordane, Møre og
Romsdal), or Central (Sør-Trøndelag, Nord-Trøndelag) part of Norway (with the Northern
area of Nordland, Troms, Finnmark serving as reference category). These five geographical
areas correspond to the traditional cultural regions of Norway (landsdel). Finally, we include
an indicator of whether the bureaucrat works in a forcefully merged region or not (see Sup-
plementary Material, Figure S2).
The second group is far broader. It includes the bureaucrat's educational background.
This regards the highest educational level achieved (six-point scale, from elementary to
PhD-degree), the educational field (Law, Economics, Social Sciences, Humanities, Natural
Sciences, with “other” serving as a reference category), and whether education has taken
place in Oslo (three-point scale: no, partly, yes). This group of controls also includes
employment information. Whether the bureaucrat works in a unit dealing with the environ-
ment, planning, the economy, legal services, information technology, culture, education,
business enterprise and industry, regional development, or traffic (with “other” serving as
reference category). We also collected information on the hierarchical position of the
bureaucrat (three-point scale, from advisor/consultant, to middle management, to top man-
agement), as well as their length of employment in the regional administration. This group
of controls also includes information on past work experience, especially in terms of
whether the bureaucrat has experience of working for the state apparatus (be it at the local,
regional, or central levels), in local government, and outside of the public sector (all
dummies). Finally, we coded information as to the extent to which the respondent's region
had been exposed to local government reform (where a merger process has also been under-
way, dummy for limited vs. larger extent) and the center-periphery status of the region itself
within the newly created region (dummy for whether the “old” regional center will serve as
the new region's headquarters). The last control is that of the (self-reported) gender of the
bureaucrat. Data sources and descriptive statistics for all controls are detailed in the supple-
mentary material (Table S1).
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3.4 | Methods
The data are analyzed through a series of multilevel models. We employ multilevel methods
as we do not expect our data to be independently and identically distributed. Regional
bureaucrats are embedded within distinct regions and hence share a number of (observed
and unobserved) properties within their regional administration. We explore this expecta-
tion empirically by measuring the amount of regional clustering on the outcome variable.
The level of intraclass correlation is estimated at around 8.8%. In other words, 8.8% of varia-
tion on attitudes towards forced mergers is attributable to regional clustering. We therefore
run two-level models with the 18 regions defined as upper-level groups. As our dependent
variable takes the form of an ordinal scale, we ran the ordered logit version of our hierarchi-
cal model.
Since some variables correlate within our dataset we also check for possible multicollinearity.
The variance inflation factor (VIF) for the parsimonious and full models returns overall and
individual values which indicate that multicollinearity is not an issue in this study. In the par-
simonious model, the average VIF is at 1.19 while the maximum VIF is at 1.39 (Improve
regional services). In the full model with all controls, the average VIF is at 1.60 while the
maximum VIFs are at 3.91, 3.70, and 3.16, respectively (East, West, and Population). The dif-
ferent multilevel ordered logit models are reported in table format in the supplementary
materials (Tables S2–S4).
Increase Regional Autonomy (imp.)





.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Odds ratio
Parsimonious Controls (geo, pop, unempl.)
Extended Controls
FIGURE 1 The effect of framing, voluntary merger preferences, left–right ideology, and attachment on
support for forced mergers.
Note: Results from multilevel ordered logit models, with regions defined as the upper level (n = 18) and
bureaucrats defined as the lower level (n = 1107, except in the final model where n = 1105). Odds ratios with
99% and 95% confidence intervals are displayed for three models: (a) a “parsimonious” model including only the
variables of theoretical interest, (b) a model with geographical, population size, and unemployment controls,
and (c) an “extended controls” model with a 33 individual and regional-level controls. The three models are
reported in the supplementary material (Table S2)
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4 | UNDERSTANDING SUPPORT FOR FORCED MERGERS
Norwegian regional bureaucrats are not in favor of forced mergers. Among the 1107 respon-
dents over half report a negative view. About 33% are “very negative” and 25% are “negative,”
representing 58% of respondents. This is a clear majority against. The rest are “neutral” (11%),
“positive” (22%), and “very positive” (9%). Hence, while a majority of bureaucrats are against
the reform, the average bureaucrat is somewhere between negative (coded 2) and neutral
(coded 3) (x = 2.50). If bureaucrats are generally against the forced variant of the reform, they
are far more supportive of a voluntary process. Indeed, less than 17% are against voluntary
mergers (“very negative” = 5% and “negative” = 12%). There is a clear majority in favor with
about 68% of respondent being either “positive” or “very positive” (evenly split, about 34%
each). Overall, the average respondent is situated relatively close to a “positive” attitude (coded
FIGURE 2 Relation between forced and voluntary mergers.
Note: Top-left panel represents kernel density estimates of support for mergers. Light blue shows estimates for
forced mergers, dark red for voluntary mergers. Top-right panel represents the bivariate relationship between
forced mergers (y) and voluntary mergers (x). The two-by-two matrix classifies observations along the (not)
forced-(not)voluntary quadrotomy. Line displays the fractional-polynomial predicted values of forced mergers
with 95% confidence interval. Observations jittered. Bottom-middle panel displays a density heat map. Lighter
shades of red represent higher densities, darker shades of green represent lower densities
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4) (x = 3.81). Despite their contrasted distributions (see Figure 2, top-left panel) attitudes
towards forced and voluntary mergers are nonetheless significantly and positively related
(r = .44, p < .001). This represents an important finding: bureaucrats have opposite views
regarding forced and voluntary mergers, resulting in mirror-like distributions, but these atti-
tudes are nonetheless positively associated. Bureaucrats who are enthusiastic about voluntary
mergers will dislike forced mergers a little less.
Within the framework of the regional reform, bureaucrats find that improving regional pub-
lic services is most important (x = 4.53) followed by increasing regional autonomy (x = 4.21).
Reducing the bureaucracy is still considered as important (x = 3.89) but only in a tertiary posi-
tion. Finally, regional bureaucrats come across as somewhat left-wing, placing themselves
between the center-left and the center (x = 2.50). Indeed, about 60% of respondents locate them-
selves on the left side, while 25% place themselves on the right side. However, irrespective of
left–right affinities (r =.04, p = .23), Norwegian bureaucrats tend to feel very attached to their
region of employment. On a 10-point scale, mean attachment is at 7.81 while the median is at
8. These descriptive statistics are summarized in Table 2.
We evaluate our main expectations in three different models. In a first model, we test our
core hypotheses: the three framing effects (regional autonomy, regional services, and reduction
of bureaucracy), support for voluntary mergers, left–right ideology, and feeling of attachment.
In a second model, we add some regional controls, namely, the region's demographic weight, it
is unemployment levels, and it is cultural-traditional landsdel. In a third model, we add all
remaining controls (see “Controls” section). Figure 1 displays the results of all three models for
the variables of theoretical interest. Table-format results are reported in the supplementary
material (Table S2), where we also rerun all the analyses controlling for whether the bureaucrat
works in a forcefully merged region (Supplementary Material, Figure S2). Our findings are
robust throughout.
The first result of note is that the variables of theoretical interest are hardly affected by the
inclusion of numerous individual and regional controls. Second, framing effects, on the whole,
fare rather poorly. Although bureaucrats consider increasing regional autonomy and improving
regional public services of upmost importance in the reform process (x = 4.21 and x = 4.53, on
a 1–5 scale), these two elements do not buy support for forced mergers. Neither variable has a
TABLE 2 Summary of dependent and explanatory variables
Explanatory factor Variable description Min-max Mean (SD) Exp. sign
Dependent variable Support for forced mergers 1–5 2.50 (1.37)
Framing effects Importance of increasing regional
autonomy
1–5 4.21 (.93) +
Importance of improved regional public
services
1–5 4.53 (.75) +
Importance of reducing bureaucracy 1–5 3.89 (1.06) +
Voluntary mergers Support for voluntary mergers 1–5 3.81 (1.17) +
Left–right ideology Self-positioning on the political left–
right axis
1–5 2.50 (1.30) +
Feeling of attachment Feeling of attachment (to region of
employment)
1–10 7.81 (2.11) 
Note: n = 1107. Data collected through the survey instrument. Controls reported in the supplementary material.
Abbreviation: SD, standard deviation.
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stable or significant effect on support for forced merger. While greater autonomy and better
public services top the wish-list of bureaucrats going through the territorial reform process,
these preferences do not affect their attitudes towards the forced nature of such a process.
Regional authority and spatial rescaling may be on the rise (Brenner, 2004; Dardanelli, 2018;
Hooghe & Marks, 2016; Keating, 2013), but they will not generate support for an unconsented
redrawing of regional boundaries.
One argument, however, does boost support for forced mergers: that of cutting back on
bureaucracy. This relationship comes across as particularly robust. In its bivariate expression, it
is quite clear (r = .29, p < .001). In a multivariate setting, the returned odds ratios indicate that,
with each unit increase on the five-point scale, a respondent is about 38% more likely to support
forced mergers. Hence, despite some skepticism in the academic literature as to the extent to
which mergers trigger real efficiency gains, arguments about bureaucratic streamlining still
hold purchase among bureaucrats themselves (Afonso & Venâncio, 2019; Blom-Hansen
et al., 2020; Steiner & Kaiser, 2017). Those who believe in its importance in reform processes
are more likely to support forced mergers. Those who value less such arguments are in turn a
lot more skeptical of forceful amalgamations between unwilling partners.
One of the most powerful explanans of support for forced mergers, however, can be found in
attitudes towards voluntary mergers. The literature has highlighted that merger debates tend to
overlook the question of the process through which mergers are achieved (Erlingsson et al., 2015;
Erlingsson et al., 2020; Ryan et al., 2016). The vices and virtues of mergers are discussed while
obscuring issues of procedure and method. Following this line of argument, we expected that,
when faced with a reform process mixing voluntary and forced mergers, the main dividing line
between bureaucrats would be about outcome (merging or not) rather than process (forced or vol-
untary). Figure 2 provides further information on the relationship between voluntary and forced
mergers. Preferences for these two types of mergers are distributed as mirror opposites, with
bureaucrats skeptical towards forced mergers and more enthusiastic about voluntary ones
(Figure 2, top-left panel). Nonetheless, theses preferences correlate positively and significantly
(top-right panel, r = .44, p < .001). The more one likes voluntary mergers, the less one dislikes
forced mergers. This is further illustrated by the density heatmap where the brighter red areas
indicate the stronger association patterns (bottom panel). The overall odds ratios are strikingly
high. Supporters of voluntary mergers are more than two times as likely to support forced
mergers too. Hence, while bureaucrats dislike forced mergers, their enthusiasm for voluntary
mergers can lessen such an aversion. We further analyze the differences in support between
forced and voluntary mergers in the online Supplementary Material (see Figure S1).
A bureaucrat's left–right placement on the political spectrum also matters. As expected from
the literature on the partisan dynamics of territorial reform and municipal mergers
(Steiner, 2003; Toubeau & Wagner, 2015), we find that right-wing bureaucrats are more likely
to support forced mergers than their left-wing colleagues. This relationship comes across
equally in bivariate (r = .29, p < .001) and in multivariate settings. The effect is of comparable
magnitude to that of bureaucratic streamlining. With each right-hand move on the left–right
continuum, a bureaucrat is about 37% more likely to support forced mergers.
Finally, as expected from postfunctionalist approaches (Hooghe & Marks, 2016;
Keating, 2013), we find that identity effects are powerful shapers of preferences towards gover-
nance structures. Feelings of belonging express themselves in a variety of ways. However,
attachment to one's region will nourish resistance towards its forceful redrawing. Again, this
effect is significant in both bivariate (r = .18, p < .001) and multivariate settings and its mag-
nitude is not to be belittled. Measured on a 10-point scale, each move up the attachment ladder
MYKSVOLL ET AL. 13
decreases the likelihood of supporting forced mergers by 13%. As Zimmerbauer and Paasi had
noted in the Finnish case, when under threat from reform processes “regional identity, borders,
and symbols become significant, since amalgamations shake the attachments or identities of cit-
izens who have possibly participated in the institutionalization of the regional unit” (2013: 39).
Clearly, and probably to a greater degree than ordinary citizens, regional bureaucrats will be
particularly sensitive to threats towards the regional milieu they belong to and identify with.
5 | INTERACTION EFFECTS AND THE GOLDEN TRIANGLE
OF SUPPORT
While the above effects provide some insights, one cannot help but wonder how the different
explanatory variables interact when shaping support for forced mergers. Does attachment medi-
ate the effect of right-wing ideology? Does support for voluntary mergers moderate the impact
of preferences for bureaucracy reduction? The study of interactive effects can shed some light
on these questions. Multivariate analysis provides an understanding of the direct effect of a
given variable while holding all other variables constant. However, in real-world situations, dif-
ferent factors sometimes interact with one another in ways which may boost or dampen their
discrete effects. To model this, we run two-way and three-way interaction terms (Berry
et al., 2012). These analyses are reported in table format in the supplementary material
(Tables S3 and S4).
We assess how the four significant explanatory variables—reduction of bureaucracy, volun-
tary mergers, left–right ideology, and attachment—interact with one another. Two-way interac-
tion models tell us to what extent the effect of X on Y is conditioned by values on a third
variable Z. The two-way interactions reported in Figure 3 enlighten us on a number of condi-
tional dynamics. Our first finding is that attachment dampens the impact of all three other sig-
nificant variables. Attachment decreases the effect of left–right ideology (panel C), of voluntary
merger support (panel D), and of bureaucracy reduction (panel E). In other words, none of
these variables are immune to the countervailing effect of identity, as expressed through feel-
ings of attachment. Second, right-wing ideology tends to boost factors of support. While attach-
ment weakens the “supportive” effect of other variables, moving to the right of the political
spectrum magnifies the effect of bureaucracy arguments (panel A) and of voluntary mergers
(panel B). Finally, we find that the bureaucratic reduction argument gains in potency as support
for voluntary mergers increases (panel F).
Overall, the two-way interaction analysis brings home two main insights. First, the litera-
ture on identity and community has argued that preferences regarding the territorial architec-
ture of government are strongly affected by feelings of belonging and attachment (Hooghe &
Marks, 2016; Keating, 2013; Zimmerbauer & Paasi, 2013). We here find that feelings of attach-
ment not only have a negative effect on forced merger support, but that this variable also
weakens the effect of variables otherwise boosting support for coerced amalgamation. Put oth-
erwise, feelings of attachment trump other considerations when a jurisdiction's borders are
being redrawn. Second, factors conducive to greater support tend to magnify one another. In
that sense, bureaucratic streamlining, voluntary merger support, and right-wing ideology seem
to constitute a “golden triangle” of support for forced mergers.
If these three variables constitute a “golden triangle” of support for forced mergers, how can
we better understand the nature of their triangular interaction? How do bureaucratic
streamlining, voluntary mergers, and right-wing ideology mutually affect each other on the




FIGURE 3 The conditional effects of bureaucracy, ideology, voluntary mergers, and attachment on forced
mergers.
Note: Conditional marginal effects modeled through two-way interaction terms. Thick dashed lines provide 95%
confidence intervals. Thin dashed line is a kernel density estimate of the conditioning variable (Z). Vertical
straight line is the mean of the conditioning variable (Z). M.E. = marginal effects of X on Y, depending on
values of Z. All other variables held at their mean. Based on full models reported in the supplementary material
(Table S3)
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question of forced mergers? We explore this more complex relationship by running a three-way
interaction effect. Figure 4 shows the effect of bureaucracy reduction (X) on support for forced
mergers (Y) as conditioned by support for voluntary mergers (Z) and left–right ideology (W).
The results indicate that all three factors positively affect one another to enhance their overall
impact. Even in the extreme scenario of a left-wing bureaucrat having a “very negative” view of
voluntary mergers, bureaucracy reduction arguments still increase support for forced mergers.
However, the views of left-wing bureaucrats will converge with those of right-wing bureaucrats
as their support for voluntary mergers increase. In this sense, strong support for voluntary
mergers gradually erases partisan differences and amplifies the impact of bureaucratic
streamlining arguments. In contrast, strong opposition to voluntary mergers magnifies partisan
differences and somewhat dilutes the effect of streamlining arguments.
6 | CONCLUSIONS
Institutions are living organisms. Once created, they tend to take a life of their own. Path
dependencies, sunk costs, institutional stickiness, and barriers to change all highlight the diffi-
culties of reforming existing institutions. Territorial institutions are no different. They can be
notably difficult to reform. Nonetheless, reforms do take place. They tend to take one of two
FIGURE 4 The “golden triangle” of support for forced mergers.
Note: Conditional marginal effects modeled through a three-way interaction analysis. Stars indicate p-value < .05.
M.E. = marginal effects of X (bureaucracy reduction) on Y (support for forced mergers), depending on values of
Z (voluntary mergers) andW (left–right ideology). All other variables held at their mean. Based on full the model
reported in the supplementary material (Table S4)
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forms. Regional authorities can be empowered/disempowered (Dardanelli, 2018; Hooghe &
Marks, 2016) or they can be redrawn through amalgamation/fragmentation processes (Blom-
Hansen et al., 2011; Bourdin & Torre, 2021; Zimmerbauer et al., 2017).
In this context, the Norwegian regional reform is both typical and atypical. It is typical in
the sense that the reform regards both geography and competences. It is atypical in two ways at
least. First, this merger reform is historically unprecedented in that regional borders had been
almost unchanged since the 1660s. Second, the merger process came in two variants: voluntary
mergers and forced ones. This provides an unusual opportunity for researchers to better under-
stand attitudes towards forced mergers.
We here bring five key findings to the discussion. First, bureaucrats sensitive to efficiency
gains through bureaucratic streamlining will be most likely to support forced mergers. Other
concerns such as improved regional public services or increased regional autonomy are not rele-
vant to understand support for such coercive processes. Second, those in favor of voluntary
mergers are also less likely to oppose forced mergers. Bureaucrats may dislike forced mergers,
but eagerness for voluntary mergers may attenuate aversion to the forced variant. Third, right-
wing bureaucrats are least averse to coercive processes. Fourth, identity, and especially feelings
of attachment to one's region, generate resistance towards forced mergers. This factor is particu-
larly interesting as it has a significant direct effect, but also weakens the effect of variables oth-
erwise increasing support for forced mergers. Fifth and finally, one can identify a “golden
triangle” of support for forced mergers consisting of right-wing ideology, a fondness for volun-
tary mergers, and enthusiasm for bureaucracy reduction.
At a more general level two conclusions seem particularly relevant. First, identity matters.
As highlighted by the postfunctionalist literature, identity is a powerful shaper of preferences
when it comes to the institutional architecture of government (Hooghe & Marks, 2016;
Keating, 2021). Identity may be constructed and contested but it nonetheless constitutes a for-
midable mobiliser (Zimmerbauer & Paasi, 2013). It will trigger demands for change (such as
secession requests in the cases of Catalonia and Scotland) just as it will impede reform pro-
cesses perceived as a threat (such as the proposed merger of the Britany region into the larger
Pays de la Loire region). This study shows that attachment—as an expression of identity—will
generate resistance towards coercive territorial reforms. Policymakers are ill-advised to push
for jurisdictional reforms where territorial identity is strong. Second, the analysis of the
“golden triangle” of support for forced mergers underscores the linkages between right-wing
ideology, beliefs about bureaucratic streamlining, and preferences for mergers. At a certain
level, claims about amalgamation, larger units, economies of scale, and bureaucratic reform all
echo a broader narrative often circulated by neoliberal discourses of governmental restructur-
ing. Roberts (2011) has commented on the rise of a “logic of discipline” influencing the archi-
tecture of government. This logic of discipline tends to be associated with right-wing ideology
(economic liberalism more particularly) and beliefs about the necessary rationalization of pub-
lic authorities. This worldview also tends to be less averse to more coercive, forceful, or con-
straining measures (Roberts, 2011: 5). Hence, when understanding attitudes towards forced
territorial mergers, two logics seem to be at play. A community, identity logic which will gen-
erate resistance towards forced change. And a logic of discipline which is more sensitive to
neoliberal arguments of bureaucratic efficiency and amalgamation into broader units.
Clearly, this research has limitations and we invite scholars to further explore the contested
land of coerced institutional change. We here contribute with an analysis of one type of institu-
tional change: forced territorial mergers. The Norwegian case brings many elements to the
debate, in the context of a reform of historic magnitude which mixes voluntary and forced
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elements. We invite our colleagues to further study these dynamics on different questions such
as other instances of coerced institutional change (e.g., institutional abolition) and on compara-
ble questions of forced mergers but in a different setting (e.g., outside of the Nordic countries).
Indeed, Norway remains an instance of “consensus democracy” with high levels of trust in pub-
lic authorities, of citizen participation in its polity, of transparency, and of accountability
(Lijphart, 1999; Narud & Strøm, 2004). Future research will have to establish the extent to
which factors affecting support for forced mergers are also at play in other national and cultural
settings. Our expectation is that these findings will travel to some degree at least. Indeed, they
have already been found to have an impact in country-specific studies as well as in larger com-
parative analyses. Other studies have highlighted the effects of bureaucratic streamlining argu-
ments (Blom-Hansen et al., 2020; Callanan et al., 2014; Steiner & Kaiser, 2017), of forced versus
voluntary processes (Erlingsson et al., 2015; Erlingsson et al., 2020; Ryan et al., 2016), of right-
wing ideology on territorial reform (Steiner, 2003; Toubeau & Wagner, 2015), and of attachment
and feelings of belonging (Hooghe & Marks, 2016; Tatham & Bauer, 2021; Zimmerbauer &
Paasi, 2013). We nonetheless encourage further and more diverse research into the determi-
nants of support for coerced institutional change.
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